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Summary. The paper considers the determinacy ofthe equilibrium price level in the 
cash-in-advance monetary economy of Lucas and Stokey (1983, 1987), in the case 
of deterministic "fundamentals". The possibilities both of a multiplicity of perfect 
foresight equilibria and of "sunspot equilibria" are considered. Two types of 
monetary policy regimes are considered and compared, one in which the money 
supply grows at a given exogenous rate (that may be positive or negative), and one 
in which the nominal interest rate on one-period government debt is pegged at a 
given non-negative l vel. In the case of constant money growth rate regimes, it is 
shown that one can easily have both indeterminacy ofperfect foresight equilibrium 
and existence of sunspot equilibria; indeed, in the case of negative rates of money 
growth (as called for by Friedman (1969)), both types of indeterminacy necessarily 
occur. On the other hand, sufficient conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium (and 
non-existence of equilibria other than a deterministic steady state) are also given, 
and a class of cases is identified in which a sufficiently high rate of money growth 
guarantees this. Thus there may be a conflict between the aims of choosing a rate 
of money growth that results in a high level of welfare in the steady state quilibrium 
and choosing arate that makes this steady state the unique equilibrium.) In the case 
of the interest rate pegging regimes, sufficient conditions are given for uniqueness 
of equilibrium (and impossibility of sunspot equilibria), and it is shown that these 
necessarily hold in the case of any low enough nominal interest rate. Thus the 
nominal interest rate peg allows simultaneous achievement of price level deter- 
minacy and a high level of welfare in the unique (steady state) equilibrium. 
In this paper I consider the consequences of alternative choices of the monetary 
policy regime for the determinacy ofthe rational expectations equilibrium value of 
money, and in particular for the existence or not of "sunspot" equilibria, i.e., rational 
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expectations equilibria in which fluctuations in the price level occur in response to 
random events that represent no change in economic "fundamentals", imply due 
to self-fulfilling revisions of people's expectations. I am interested in particular in 
making the point that a consideration of the complete set of possible equilibria 
associated with a given policy regime may alter one's evaluation of the relative 
desirability of alternative policies, relative to the conclusion that one might reach 
if one considered only a single possible equilibrium associated with each policy 
regime (perhaps a unique quilibrium involving a"minimum set of state variables"). 
In view of this I give particular attention to policy regimes of types that have 
sometimes been advocated as ways of reducing the inefficiency associated with a 
rate of return differential between money and other financial assets, and show that 
policies that might otherwise be desirable (policies that make possible a more 
desirable quilibrium than would otherwise be possible) can have the unfortunate 
consequence of rendering equilibrium indeterminate and making possible quilibrium 
fluctuations in response to "sunspot" events. 
Two classes of policy regimes are considered in particular: on the one hand, 
alternative constant rates of growth or contraction of the money supply, financed 
through lump sum taxes or transfers, with zero net government assets at all times; 
and on the other, alternative constant nominal interest rate pegs, to be maintained 
through open market operations between money and interest-bearing debt, with an 
exogenously fixed level of net transfer payments. The first class of policies is 
considered because of Friedman's (1969) well-known proposal that a constant 
contraction ofthe money supply of this sort would be welfare improving. I find that 
while the stationary equilibrium associated with the Friedman regime achieves the 
maximum possible level of utility for the representative consumer, and while the 
level of utility associated with stationary equilibrium may be monotonically 
decreasing in the rate of money growth, lower rates of money growth (in particular, 
rates near that called for by Friedman) are associated with indeterminacy of
equilibrium and the existence of sunspot equilibria, while these problems need not 
arise in the case of higher ates of money growth. 
The second class of policies is considered because they represent an obvious 
alternative approach to the elimination of the same rate of return differential with 
which Friedman is concerned. Achievement ofpermanently low nominal interest 
rates through a simple interest rate peg is not often advocated; one reason is that 
it is often asserted that such a policy must result in price level indeterminacy. In 
fact, I find that if the interest rate pegging regime is properly specified, it results in a 
unique rational expectations equilibrium, regardless of the level at which interest 
rates are to be pegged. Thus not only does the interest rate peg not result in price 
level indeterminacy but it allows nominal interest rates to be maintained permanently 
at a level ower than that which can be obtained through apolicy regime of the first 
sort without creating price level indeterminacy. It would hence appear, at least in 
the case of the kind of economy modeled here, that interest rate pegging is a more 
reliable way of trying to reduce the inefficiency associated with consumers being 
forced to "economize on liquidity". 
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1. The model 
The basic structure of the model  considered here is the same as in Lucas and Stokey 
(1983, 1987). 1 The economy consists of a large number of identical consumers. The 
representative consumer seeks to maximize the expected value of 
oo 
(1.1) ~" fl'V(cl,, Czt) 
t=0 
where clt denotes per iod t consumption of "cash goods", and c2, denotes per iod t 
consumpt ion of "credit goods". The product ion technology allows one unit of either 
"cash goods" or "credit goods" to be produced using one unit of current productive 
capacity; each consumer is endowed with y > 0 units of this capacity each period. 
The single-period utility function V is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable 
(for all posit ive values of its arguments) and to satisfy 
(A1) 1/1, V2 > 0; and V is strictly concave. 
(A2) dl - arg max V(cl, y - ci) satisfies 0 < ~i < Y. 
Cl 
Assumptions (A1) are standard,  while (A2) insures that in the absence of a cash 
constraint  both "cash goods" and "credit goods" would be consumed in equil ibrium. 
(Addit ional  assumptions regarding V are introduced below for certain of the 
results.) The discount factor/3 is assumed to be between zero and one. 
The structure of trading is as follows. Each period is divided into two sub-periods. 
In the first sub-period, financial markets are open, in which money can be exchanged 
for promises to pay money in the future, possibly contingent upon future sunspot 
realizations. (As will become clear once the policy regimes are specified below, there 
is assumed to be no randomness in "fundamentals".) It will simplify notat ion to 
1 As is well-known, there is a formal isomorphism between this model and a particular case of the 
Sidrauski-Brock model in which real money balances are written as an argument of the representative 
consumer's utility function. Accordingly, if there were a complete theory of the conditions under which 
alternative monetary policy regimes result in multiplicities of equilibria in Sidrauski-Brock models, there 
would be no need for an analysis of this kind of the Lucas-Stokey model. But while several authors have 
addressed aspects of this problem in the case of the Sidrauski-Brock model, e.g., Brock (1975), Calvo 
(1979), Obstfeld and Rogoff(1983, 1986), Obstfeld (1984), Gray (1984), and Matsuyama (1990, 1991), no 
very general treatment exists for that class of models. For example, the possibility of stochastic (i.e., 
"sunspot") equilibria in such models has been little addressed; Obstfeld and Rogoff (1986) discuss 
"stochastic price level bubbles", but they consider only one very special type of stochastic process, as 
well as restricting attention to a special class of utility functions. I take up the Lucas-Stokey model here 
rather than the more general class of all possible Sidrauski-Brock models for the sake of simplicity. The 
special class of models taken up here is one with a stronger claim to economic interest han other 
often-considered subclasses of Sidrauski-Brock models, such as those in which utility is additively 
separable between consumption and real balances - a case that results in simple quilibrium conditions 
but has no obvious interpretation in terms of an underlying source of the service flow from real balances. 
Similarly, it is not obvious in the Sidrauski-Brock framework whether utility should depend upon 
"beginning-of period" or "end-of-period" real money balances, though the choice can make a significant 
difference for the conditions under which multiple equilibria exist, as is discussed for example in 
Matsuyama (1991, sec. 6). Here the logic of the cash-in-advance setup requires that we consider amodel 
equivalent to a Sidrauski-Brock model with "beginning-of-period" real balances in the utility function. 
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assume that all securities pay off in the first sub-period of the following period; the 
"sunspot" state variable is assumed to be realized each period at the beginning of 
the first sub-period. (Because I assume the existence of a complete set of one-period 
contingent claims, the omission of multiperiod securities involves no loss of 
generality.) In the second sub-period, the goods markets and labor market are open. 
"Cash goods" must be purchased using money held at the end of the first sub-period; 
this is the "cash-in-advance constraint" and is what distinguishes "cash goods" from 
"credit goods". "Credit goods" can be purchased either with cash or on credit, which 
means payment of cash only in the first sub-period of the following period. Suppliers 
of goods during the second sub-period either eceive cash for them then, which they 
carry over into the first sub-period of the following period (since it cannot be used 
for purchases in the current sub-period), or receive cash for them during the first 
sub-period of the following period - which, from the point of view of the seller's 
budget constraint, is the same thing. Thus suppliers will be indifferent between 
supplying "cash goods" and "credit goods" only if the money price of both types of 
goods is the same; so whenever both types of goods are supplied, the prices of the 
two goods must always be the same. Let p, denote the money price of all goods 
supplied in period t. 
The underlying probability structure (representing the statistical properties of 
the "sunspot" process upon which the various state variables may depend in 
equilibrium) can be represented asusual by a sequence of sigma-fields {It}. I will 
assume that in the initial period (t = 0), there is only one possible state, so that it is 
possible to introduce a complete system of contingent claims markets without 
having to introduce trading in any periods prior to period zero. As usual the 
notation Et(...) will denote expectation conditional upon It. I make no specific 
assumption about the probabilistic nature of the sunspot process (e.g., it is not 
assumed to be stationary), because I want to be able to consider afully general class 
of possible sunspot equilibria; when conditions are given below under which 
sunspot equilibria do not exist, it should be clear that sunspot equilibria of all sorts 
have been ruled out, not simply sunspot equilibria with a particular kind of 
probability structure. I assume that a complete set of one-period contingent 
securities is traded during the first sub-period of each period. The prices of these 
securities can be described by a pricing kernel {r t § 1), a random variable measurable 
with respect o It+l, such that the cost in terms of money paid during the first 
sub-period of period t of any particular random payment xt § 1 of money during the 
first sub-period of period t + 1 (such that xt+ 1 is measurable with respect to It+ 1) 
is given by Et(rt+lXt§ 1). (The value of rt§ 1 in the case of a particular period t + 1 
sunspot realization is essentially the price in terms of money in period t of a 
contingent claim that pays off one unit of money in that state only, divided by the 
probability of occurrence of that state conditional upon the history of sunspot 
realizations up until period t.) 
Given perfect foresight (rational expectations) onthe part of the representative 
consumer regarding the stochastic price processes 2 {p,, rt}, the aggregate money 
2 In the following definitions I use the term "stochastic process" to refer to a sequence of functions on 
a certain sequence of sigma-fields, and so to include the possibility of a sequence of constant functions, 
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supply process {Me}, and the process for planned lump sum nominal transfers to 
each consumer {He}, his problem is to choose consumption and asset demands {clt, 
c2,, MT, BT+ a} where cat, c2t, M 7, and B, d are each measurable with respect to I,, to 
maximize the expected value of (1.1), subject o the sequence of budget constraints 
(1.2a) Mat + Et[rt+ 1B~+ a3 < We + Ht 
(1.2b) pectt < Mat 
(1.2c) cat, CEt > 0 
d (1.2d) Wt+ a = M~ + Pt(Y - cat - CEt) + Be+ a 
oo 
(1.2e) Wt+l ~ --  qt+ll E Et+a[re+j+,3 
j= l  
Constraints (1.2a)-(1.2c) must hold at each date t > 0 and under each possible 
contingency, while constraints (1.2d)-(1.2e) must hold at each date t + 1 > 1 and 
under each possible contingency. Here M d denotes the representative consumer's 
desired money balances at the end of the first sub-period of period t, B, n denotes the 
quantity of money received by the representative consumer during the first 
subperiod of period t from the securities that he acquired uring the first sub-period 
of the previous period (negative in the case that he sold securities hort), and Bit 
denotes the consumer's nominal wealth at the beginning of the first sub-period of 
period t, before receiving the lump-sum transfer Hr In (1.2e), 
Yt+~+ 1=-- qt+j+ lPt+jY + qt+jHt+j 
where present values are defined using factors 
qt = r l r2 . . ,  rt 
(I also define qo = 1.) 
Constraint (1.2a) is the consumer's budget constraint for the securities market 
during the first sub-period of period t; in addition to period t money balances, he 
chooses a random variable Brd+ a, measurable with respect o It+ a, indicating the 
value of his bond portfolio in every possible state that may be realized at the 
beginning of period t + 1. Constraints (1.2b)-(1.2e) constrain goods purchases 
during the second sub-period of period t. Constraint (1.2b) is the previously men- 
tioned cash-in-advance onstraint for purchases of"cash goods". Constraints (1.2c) 
are standard non-negativity constraints. Equation (1.2d) indicates how period tpur- 
chases affect the household's nominal wealth at the beginning of the following 
period. (Note that Wt+ a may depend upon the "sunspot" state realized at the 
beginning of period t + 1, insofar as the value Of the household's bond portfolio 
may be different in different states. Wo is given as an initial condition.) 
i.e., a deterministic sequence. It is not intended that an equilibrium must involve any randomness, and 
indeed the equilibria studied here are not random, except as a result of self-fulfilling expectations. It is 
important, however, to introduce notation that allows for stochastic equilibria, in order to consider 
whether they exist or not. 
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Constraint (1.2e) is a limit on the household's ability to borrow; note that apart 
from this constraint, here is no limit either upon the household's ability to issue 
d debt in the first sub-period (choose a portfolio in which B~+ 1 < 0 for some or all 
possible states the next period) or to purchase "credit goods" in the second 
sub-period. The constraint (1.2e) must be satisfied for each possible state realized at 
the beginning of period t + 1; it thus amounts to a set of constraints upon goods 
purchases and bond issues in period t. The bound states that debt at the beginning 
of period t + 1 must be able to be eventually repaid out of revenues from goods 
sales or net government transfers in periods t + 1 and later. In computing the present 
value of these future income streams, ales revenues from period t + j are discounted 
using qt+j+l, because they cannot be spent before period t+ j+ 1, while net 
lump-sum transfers in period t + j  are discounted using q~§ because they can be 
spent in period t +j. Finally, it is assumed (in order for a consumer to have a 
well-defined maximization problem, and hence as part of the definition of equilibrium) 
that the infinite sum in (1.2e) converges to a finite value. 
The monetary-fiscal policy regime must be specified so that the stochastic 
processes for the money supply, the supply of securities {B~ + 1 }, lump sum transfers 
{Ht}, and securities prices {rt§ 1}, satisfy the government budget constraint 
(1.3a) Mt + Et[rt+~Bt+~] = Mt_~ + Bt + Ht 
at each date t _> 1 and under each possible contingency. In period 0, this constraint 
takes the form 
(1.3b) M o + Eo[r~B1] = W o + H o 
where Wo is again an initial condition. In this paper, I consider two possible types 
of policy regime. In the case of a money supply growth rule, a deterministic path for 
the money supply {Mr} is specified exogenously. The net supply of securities of all 
types is zero (so that Bt+ 1 = 0 under every contingency), and net transfers are 
accordingly given by 
Ht = Mt - Mr-1 
at all dates t > 1. In the initial period, one must have Ho = Mo - Wo .3 
In the case of an interest rate peg, on the other hand, the government fixes the 
price each period of a riskless one-period nominal bond, and stands ready to 
exchange money for this bond in any quantities chosen by the private sector. This 
3 It is not essential to any of the subsequent results that there never be any outstanding government 
debt. Given the evolution of the money supply, the set of equilibrium price level processes {Pt} is the 
same for any specification of the processes {Bt, H~} that satisfy (1.3a)-(1.3b) and a present-value 
government budget constraint; this is the usual "Ricardian equivalence" result for a representative- 
consumer economy. Because the bond market plays no role in the determination f the equilibrium price 
level under this policy regime, I assume for simplicity that there are no government transactions in this 
market. Given the existence of a representative consumer, it is then obvious that the set of equilibria 
described here would be the same if some or all of the securities markets were assumed not to exist. And 
even in the case of more general policy specifications, it is important to note that alternative choices of 
the sequence {Mr} require corresponding choices of fiscal policy: for the present value of net transfers 
must equal the present value of seignorage revenues, even if the two are not equal in every period. 
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means that neither the processes {Mr} nor {Bt+ 1} are chosen by the government, 
as the private sector's demands must be allowed to determine the composition of 
government liabilities. However, it is assumed that the government buys or sells 
only the riskless bond (i.e., a bond that pays off the same amount of money in the 
following period regardless of the sunspot state realized), so that all other types of 
securities are always in zero net supply. 4 This means that in equilibrium, Bt +1 is 
required to be measurable with respect to It, as are M t and H t. In this case, conditions 
(1.3a) and (1.3b) become 
(1.4a) Mt + Bt+t/Rt = Mt -x  + Bt + Ht 
(1.4b) Mo + B1/Ro = Wo + Ho 
respectively, where 
(1.4c) Rt = Et[rt+ 1]-1 
is the gross nominal interest rate paid by the riskless bond issued in the first 
sub-period of period t. In this kind of policy regime, the government fixes a 
deterministic nominal interest rate sequence {R,}. In addition, the government 
chooses a fiscal policy, that determines the rate of growth of total government 
liabilities, though not their composition. In the case considered here, it will be 
assumed that the government chooses a deterministic sequence {h,} for real net 
transfers to the private sector, whereupon each period H, = p,h t. The exogenous 
sequences {R t, hi} thus define the policy regime in this case. 
In the case of either type of policy regime, I will define equilibrium as follows. 
Definition. A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is a set of stochastic 
processes {p,, rt+ l, R,, clt, c2,, Met, Bat+l, Mt, Bt+ 1, Ht}, such that Pt, r,+ l >0 at all 
dates and under all contingencies (hereafter, "a.d.a.c."), and such that 
(i) each of the variables {Pt, r,, R t, ca,, c2,, Met, Bet+l, M~, B,+ I, H~} is measurable 
with respect o It, 
(ii) the variables {rt+ 1, R,} are related by (1.4c) a.d.a.c.; 
(iii) the variables {Pt, rt+ 1, M,, B,+ 1, H~} are consistent with the specification of 
the monetary-fiscal policy regime (which amounts to satisfying (1.3a)-(1.3b) and two 
additional equations, a.d.a.c.); 
a (iv) the variables {clt, c2,, Met, B,§ represent an optimal plan for the 
representative consumer, given the price processes {Pt, rt+ 1}, the transfers {/4,}, and 
initial nominal wealth I4/o; and 
(v) markets clear, i.e., the conditions 
(t.5a) c lt ~- c 2t = Y 
(1.5b) d _ M t - M t 
(1.5c) Btd+ 1 = B,+ 1 
hold a.d.a.c. 
4 Because of the assumption of a representative consumer, this has the consequence that the set of 
equilibria is ,unaffected by the existence of markets for the contingent securities. 
352 M. Woodford 
(1.7) 
where 
Condition (1.5c) is a requirement for securities market clearing at date t, but must 
hold for each possible contingent security traded at date t, which is to say, for each 
possible contingency that may be realized at date t + 1. I will call an equilibrium 
in which all state variables are deterministic a perfect foresioht equilibrium. 
(Equilibria of this kind always exist, if any equilibria exist, in the case of the kinds 
of policy regimes described above, because the policy regime itself introduces no 
randomness into the equilibrium conditions.) An equilibrium in which any of the 
state variables are stochastic s a sunspot equilibrium, since the randomization must 
be purely due to self-fulfilling expectations. 
I now proceed to a characterization f REE in terms of processes atisfying a
certain system of difference quations. 
Lemma 1. The representative consumer's securities demands are not defined 
unless 
(1.6) R 7 = Et[r,+ ~3 -t  > 1 
a.d.a.c. Thus this is necessarily true of any equilibrium. 
Proof: In the case of a negative nominal interest rate, pure arbitrage profits are 
possible by selling short the riskless bond and holding money. Note that (1.2d) 
allows such an operation to be conducted on an arbitrarily large scale without any 
reduction in W~+I (and hence any violation of (1.2e)), and since the constraint (1.2b) 
is also relaxed, there is no limit to the extent o which a consumer will wish to do 
so. 9 
Lemma 2. Suppose that Pt, rt+l > 0 a.d.a.c., and furthermore that (1.6) holds 
a.d.a.c. Then the set of consumption and money holding plans {c1~ , c27, M, a} 
consistent with the representative consumer's budget constraints (1.2) consists of all 
plans satisfying (1.2b)-(1.2c) a.d.a.c., and the single present-value budget constraint 
oo ~3 
Y, Eo[X,+d _< Eo[rT+l] + Wo 
7=0 t=O 
I t+  1 ~ qtptclt + qt+ lP,Czt + (qt -- qt+ 1)(M~ -- PtClt) 
and Yt+l is the same quantity as is referred to in (1.2e). 
Proof: Multiply both sides of (1.2a) by qt, and add to each the left and right hand 
sides of (1.2d) multiplied by qt+ 1. Taking expectations conditional upon Io, one 
obtains 
Eo[XT+ 1 + q7+ tW~+ 1] < Eo[Y,+ 1 + qtWT] 
summing over periods t = 0 through T, one obtains 
T T 
Eo[XT+l] + Eo[qr+aWr+l] <- Z Eo[Yt+l]+ Wo 
t=O t=O 
Substituting the lower bound (1.2e) for Wr+ 1 then yields 
T 
(1.8) Col-X,+1] _< EoI-YT+d + Wo 
7=0 7=0 
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This inequality must hold for all T. Because of the inequalities (1.2b)-(1.2c), the left 
hand side of (1.8) is a non-decreasing series in T. Hence the limit as T~ ~ is 
well-defined, and is bounded by the right hand side. Thus constraints (1.2) imply 
(1.7). 
Conversely, if the plan {c1,, c2~, M~} satisfies (1.2b)-(1.2c) and (1.7), it is possible 
to choose a plan {B~+ 1} such that (1.2a), (1.2b) and (1.2e) are also satisfied a.d.a.c. 
{B, +x } satisfy Let the process a 
(1.9) B~+, =q,+l I ~ e,+l[Xt+j+13-q -1,+1 ~ E,+II-Y,+~+I] 
j= l  j= l  
- M~ + p,(c l ,  + c2, - y) 
Note that the second term on the right hand side has been assumed to be a well- 
defined and finite sum. It can furthermore be shown, using the same argument as 
was used to derive (1.8), that this implies that the first term on the right hand side 
must be a well-defined and finite sum as well. Hence (1.9) defines a definite finite 
quantity a.d.a.c. Note also that conditions (1.2b)-(1.2c) and (1.6) guarantee that the 
first term on the right hand side is non-negative. Using (1.2d), this then implies that 
Wt+ 1 satisfies (1.2e). Furthermore, multiplying both sides of the above by rt+ 1 and 
taking expectations conditional upon I t yields 
r O0 
E, [ r ,+ lB f+13=qt  -1 Z Et[Xt+j+l]-qZ 1 Z E,[Y ,+j+I]  -Mr+H,  
j=O j=0 
which implies that (1.2a) is satisfied at date t as long as W~ satisfies the lower bound 
(1.2e). Thus (1.2a) and (1.2e) are always satisfied. 9 
Lemma 3. Under the hypotheses of Lemma 2, a plan {clt, Czt , M d} satisfying 
(1.2b)-(1.2c) a.d.a.c, is optimal for the representative consumer if and only if 
(i) it satisfies 
(1.10a) VI(cl , ,  c2t ) = V2(r  Czt)R, 
a.d.a.c.; 
(ii) the cash-in-advance constraint (1.2b) holds with equality a.d.a.c., unless 
Rt= l, 
(iii) it satisfies 
(1.10b) VI (c l,, c 2,)r, + 1 = fl(P,/P, + 1) VI  (C lt + 1' C 2t + 1) 
a.d.a.c.; and 
(iv) the present-value budget constraint (1.7) holds with equality. 
Proof: This characterization (equating marginal rates of substitution to relative 
prices) follows immediately from the form of the budget set established in Lemma 
2, and from the supposition that the plan involves some consumption of both types 
of goods at all times and in all contingencies. Note that it follows from the form of 
(1.7) that the "price" of excess money holdings at date t is given by Et[qt -- qt+ 1"] = 
qt[1 _ R71]. As they yield no utility, excess money balances (i.e., M7 greater than 
is required by the cash-in-advance constraint (1.2b)) will not be held unless this 
"price" is zero, i.e., unless R t = 1. 9 
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Lemma 4. Let preferences satisfy (A1)-(A2). A set of stochastic processes 5 {Pt, 
rt+i, Rt, cat, c2t, Mr, Bt+i, Ht} such that Pt, rt+i, Mt > 0 a.d.a.c, constitute a REE if 
and only if 
(i) the variables {Pt, c1,, ezt, Mr} satisfy 
(1.1 la) cit = min{MJpt, el} 
(1.11 b) c2t = y - clt 
a.d.a.c.; 
(ii) the variables {Pt, Mr} satisfy 
M ~ 1F(Mt/Pt ) = flEt[M ~+ 1G(Mt+ 1/Pt+ 1)] (1.12) 
a.d.a.c., where 
F(z) =- z V ~(min(z, Cl ) ) 
G(z) =- zV~(min(z, Cl)) 
V*(c) - Vj(c, y - c), j = 1, 2; 
(iii) the variables {Pt, rt+l, cx,, Czt} satisfy (1.10b), and the variables {rt+l, Rt} 
satisfy (1.4c), a.d.a.c.; and 
(iv) the variables {rt+ 1, m,, Bt, Ht} satisfy 
oo oO 
(1.13a) Z E,[(qt+J-qt+J+i)Mt+J]= ~. Et[q,+jHt+j]+qtWt 
j=o j=o 
at all dates t and under all contingencies, where W o is an initial condition, and W t 
at any later date is given by 
(1.13b) W, = M t_ 1 + Bt 
Proof: It follows from the form of the budget constraint (1.7) that optimization by 
the representative household requires that a.d.a.c., (Clt, c2t) maximize V(q t, c2t) 
subject to the constraint hat Rtclt + c2t not exceed its equilibrium value. (This is 
the argument used in the derivation of (1.10a).) One can exclude the possibility that 
this maximum occurs for c2t = 0; for this would require that clt = y (using (1.5a)) 
and hence that V2(Clt  , C2t ) > VI (C l t  , C2t ) (using (A1)-(A2)). But we also know from 
Lemma 1 that Rt > 1; hence the right hand side of(1.10a) must be greater than the 
left, which is not consistent with an optimum at Czt = 0. Similarly, one can exclude 
the possibility that the maximum occurs for Cat = 0; for this would require that 
c2t = y and hence that Vl(qt, c2t)> V2(clt, c2t), using the same kind of reasoning. 
Since Mr, Pt > 0 by hypothesis, it is furthermore vident that (1.2b) is a strict 
inequality at this date, which by the same reasoning as in part (ii) of Lemma 3 
requires that R t = 1. Hence the left hand side of (1.10a) must be greater than the 
right, which is not consistent with an optimum at elt= 0. Hence one necessarily has 
s I no longer bother to list asset demands and supplies as separate processes a  it is obvious that the 
processes must coincide in the case of an equilibrium. 
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clt, c2~ > 0, and the conditions given in Lemma 3 are both necessary and consistent 
for optimization. It remains to be shown that these are equivalent to the conditions 
listed above. 
I first show that the conditions given in Lemma 3 imply these. Part (ii) of Lemma 
3 asserts that if R t > 1, clt = Mt/Pr Furthermore, (1.10a) implies in this case that 
Vl(Clt, c2,)> V2(cl, c2t), so that clt < ~. On the other hand, if R t = 1, clt < Mt/pt, 
and Vl(clt, c2t)= V2(cl, c2~), so that clt = cl. Thus in either case, (1.11a) holds. 
Equilibrium condition (1.5a) then implies (1.1 l b). Thus condition (i) is necessary for 
equilibrium. Lemma 1 and condition (iii) of Lemma 3 imply that (1.4c) and (1.10b) 
are necessary for equilibrium. Multiplying both sides of (1.10b) by p71, taking 
expectations conditional upon I t, and substituting (1.4c) yields 
p;-~ V2(c., c2t) =/~/~,[PL~I Vl(c.+ 1, c~t+ 1)] 
Substituting (1.1 la)-(I.l 1 b) into this then yields (1.12). Thus conditions (ii)-(iii) 
above are also necessary for equilibrium. 
Finally, by the same argument as is used to establish Lemma 2, one can show 
that given nominal wealth Wr at the beginning of date T, the set of plans for 
consumption and money holdings at all dates T' > T consistent with the representa- 
tive consumer's budget constraints (!.2) consists of all plans satisfying (1.2b)-(1.2c) 
a.d.a.c, and a corresponding present-value budget constraint looking forward from 
date T, 
cO ~3 
Y~ E,[xt+~+d_< Y~ Et[Yt+j+d+qtWt 
j=O j=O 
It then follows from optimization that this budget constraint must hold with 
equality. Substituting (1.5a), one obtains (1.13a). Substituting (1.5a) into (1.2d), one 
obtains (1.13b). Thus condition (iv) above is also necessary for equilibrium. 
It remains to be shown that the conditions above are also sufficient for 
equilibrium. It is evident hat (1.1 l b) implies (1.5a), and the choice of notation here 
already assumes (1.5b)-(1.5c) as well. Hence it suffices to show that the conditions 
above imply all of the conditions for optimization listed in Lemma 3. If {rt+ 1} is 
chosen to satisfy (1.10b), and {Rt} is then defined by (1.4c), (1.12) implies that (1.10a) 
holds a.d.a.c. Furthermore, by the reasoning iven above to derive them, conditions 
(1.11 a)-(1.11 b) guarantee that if { Rt} satisfies (1.10a), R t > 1 a.d.a.c., and (1.5a) holds 
a.d.a.c. Thus conditions (i)-(iii) of Lemma 3 are satisfied. Furthermore, substituting 
(1.5a) into (l.13a)for date t = 0, one can show that (1.7) must hold with equality. 
Thus conditions (iv) ofLemma 3 is satisfied as well, and the plan is optimal. 9 
In considering the set of equilibria consistent with a particular policy regime, 
then, it suffices to consider the set of processes {Pt, r. M.  B,, Ht} that satisfy (1.12), 
(1.13a), and 
(1.14) r, +1 = ~(M,/Mt +1) [ G(Mt + x/Pt + 1)/G(M,/Pt) ] 
a.d.a.c., and the relations defining the policy regime. Given processes satisfying these 
conditions, equations (1.4c) and (1.1 la)-(1.1 lb) can be used to construct unique 
equilibrium values for all of the other state variables. 
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2. Constant money growth rate policies 
In this section I consider the consequences for determinacy of equilibrium of a 
particular class of policy regimes involving an exogenously determined constant 
growth rate for the money supply, so that 
M t = Mo(1 + T0 t 
Ht = Mo~Z(1 + ~z)t- 1 
for some M o > 0, ~ > - 1. I wish in particular to compare policies of this kind for 
different values of the growth rate ~z. 
In the event of a policy of this kind, (1.12) reduces to 
(2.1) F(zt) = (fill + ~r)Et[G(zt+ 1)] 
where z, - MJp,. Furthermore, (1.13a) reduces to 
co co 
E,[ (qt+j-- q,+j+ 1)Mt+j] = Z E,[q,+j(M,+j - M,+j_ 1)] + qtMt 
j=O j= l  
or equivalently, 
lim Er[qTM T_ 1] = 0 
T ~  
Substitution of (1.14) into this yields 
(2.2) lim flT E,[G(ZT)] = 0 
T~ov 
Hence we may restrict our attention to the question of which stochastic processes 
{zt} satisfy (2.1) and (2.2); to each such process for real balances there corresponds 
a unique process for the price level obtained from the specified path for the nominal 
money supply, a unique securities price process given by (1.14), and unique 
equilibrium values for all other state variables as well. 
It is useful to begin by considering the conditions under which there exist one 
or more steady state equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which the level of real balances is 
forever a positive constant. This reduces to the question of whether any solution 
z* > 0 exists to the equation 
(2.3) F(z*) = (fl/1 + zOG(z* )
A special case in which an especially strong result is possible, the case of additively 
separable preferences, i  defined by the following additional assumption. 
(A3) There exist functions u and v such that V(cl, c2) = u(cO + v(c2). 
Proposition 1. Let preferences satisfy (A1)-(A2), and consider a policy regime 
with an exogenous constant money growth rate n. If 7r < fl - 1, no steady state 
monetary equilibrium exists. If 7r = fl - 1, there exists a continuum of steady states, 
since every z* > ~1 is a solution to (2.3). If n > fl - 1, steady states will typically be 
locally isolated (and hence finite in number) if they exist. A sufficient condition for 
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existence of at least one steady state in the latter case is that 
(2.4) lim [V*(c)/V*(c)] > 8-1( 1 + n) 
c-*0 
In the case that preferences satisfy (A3) as well, (2.4) is both necessary and sufficient 
for the existence of a steady state; when (A3) and (2.4) hold, the steady state z* is 
unique. 
Proof: Note first that V(cl, y - cl) is a concave function of c1, with a maximum at 
~1- Thus it is an increasing function of c 1 for c 1 < C1, which implies that 
V*(Cl) > V*(c 0 for c~ < cl, and hence that G(z) > F(z) for all for z < dl. Note also 
that G(z) = F(z) = zV*(d 0 for all z > cl. These properties of the functions F and G 
imply the conclusions tated above in the case that n </~-1  or 7r =/~-  1. If 
n >/~ - 1, these properties imply that the left hand side of (2.3) is greater than the 
right hand side for all z* > dl, so that any solution must have z* < dl. In this region, 
there is no reason to expect F'(z)/F(z) to exactly equal G'(z)/G(z), and so generically 
all solutions z* will occur at points where these two quantities are not equal, so that 
the solutions will be locally isolated and finite in number. A sufficient condition for 
a solution to exist is that the right hand side of (2.3) be greater than the left hand 
side for small enough positive z*, which is guaranteed by (2.4). In the additively 
separable case, V*(c 0 is a monotonically decreasing function ofc v while V~(cl) is a 
monotonically increasing function. This implies that in that case, F(z)/G(z) is a non- 
decreasing function of z, monotonically increasing over the interval 0 < z < ~l- 
Hence if a solution to (2.3) exists, it will in this case be unique. 9 
It is useful to consider the possibility of non-steady-state solutions to (2.1)-(2.2) 
under three distinct categories: (a) equilibria in which zt becomes arbitrarily close 
to zero with positive probability ("self-fulfilling inflations"); (b) equilibria in which 
zt becomes arbitrarily large with positive probability ("self-fulfilling deflations"); and 
(c) non-steady-state equilibria in which z, remains forever bounded both above and 
away from zero ("bounded endogenous fluctuations"). The conditions under which 
each of these types of equilibria can exist are considered in sequence. Note that case 
(c) excludes cases (a) and (b), but that the first two categories need not be mutually 
exclusive. They are considered separately because neither class of equilibria is a 
subset of the other, and useful conditions exist that exclude quilibria of either type 
(without ruling out equilibria of the other type). 
(a) Self-fulfillin9 inflations 
It is useful to consider the 
preferences. 
(A4) 
following possible further assumption regarding 
lim cV*(c) = 0 
c~O 
Note that (A4) necessarily holds if (A3) holds and V is bounded below, though (A4) 
certainly does not require (A3). 
Proposition 2. Suppose that preferences and the rate of money growth ~ satisfy 
(A1)-(A2), (A4), and (2.4). Then there exists a continuum of perfect foresight equili- 
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bria in each of which real money balances approach zero asymptotically, and also 
an infinite number of sunspot equilibria in which real money balances approach 
zero asymptotically with positive probability. The set of sunspot equilibria includes 
both an infinite number of equilibria in which real balances approach zero 
asymptotically with probability one, and an infinite number of equilibria in which 
the probability is positive but less than one. 
Proof: Perfect foresight equilibria are sequences {zt} that satisfy 
(2.5) r (zt )  = (fl/1 + lt) G(z,+ 1) 
for all t, in addition to the transversality condition (2.2); any solution to (2.5) in 
which z, approaches zero asymptotically necessarily satisfies (2.2), so it suffices to 
show the existence of a continuum of solutions to (2.5) of this sort. Consider the 
graph of (2.5) in the z t -  Z,+l plane (with zt +1 on the vertical axis). Condition (A4) 
implies that in a neighborhood ofthe origin the graph consists of a continuous curve 
converging to the origin, with a slope at the origin of 
fl-1(1 + ~)lira [V*(c) /V*(c) ]  
c~O 
Condition (2.4) then guarantees that the graph lies below the diagonal, if the 
neighborhood is made small enough. Then there exists a z' > 0 such that for every 
0 < z~ < z', (2.5) has a unique solution such that 0 < zt+ 1 < zt. Hence starting from 
any 0 < Zo < z', one is able to construct a sequence satisfying (2.5), which represents 
a perfect foresight equilibrium. Since each such sequence ismonotonically decreasing 
and bounded below, it must converge, and it is clear that none can converge to any 
asymptotic level of real balances greater than zero. 
Stochastic solutions to (2.1) that lie forever within the interval 0 < z~ < z' are 
also easy to construct; since (2.2) must be satisfied by any such stochastic process, 
these correspond to sunspot equilibria. Since for each 0 < z, < z', there exists a 
solution z~+ 1to (2.5) in the interior of the interval (0, z~), it is also possible for each 
such z~ to find a large number of possible non-degenerate probability distributions 
for z,+ 1 that satisfy (2.1), such that 0 < zt+ ~ < zz with probability one. (Indeed, it is 
possible to find an infinite number of solutions even if the underlying probability 
distribution of the exogenous "sunspot" process has already been fixed, e.g., if one 
must find a solution such that z t+l necessarily takes on only two possible values, 
one with probability .4 and the other with probability .6.) One can thus construct 
stochastic processes that satisfy (2.1) by proceeding recursively, and there will be 
not only a continuum of possible choices for Zo, but (assuming that there are at least 
two possible sunspot realizations each period) also a continuum of possible choices 
regarding how to continue the process conditional upon the history of sunspot 
realizations up to the current period. 
The construction just described results in stochastic processes for real balances 
that converge to zero asymptotically with probability one. (This can be shown using 
the sub-martingale convergence theorem, as in the proof of Proposition 3 below.) 
But one can also construct stochastic solutions to (2.1) in which there is a positive 
probability both of real balances remaining asymptotically bounded away from zero 
and of their converging to zero. Consider, for example, solutions with the property 
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that, if0 < zt < z', zt+ 1 either equals z* (one of the solutions to (2.3)) or takes a value 
in the interval 0 < zt+ a < zt, while if zt = z*, then zt+ 1 = z* as well. As long as it is 
possible to make the probabil ity that zt+ 1 = z* (when z, # z*) small enough, one 
can find distributions of this kind that satisfy (2.1) for any 0 < z, < z'. Such a solution 
to (2.1) must satisfy (2.2), and so it constitutes a rational expectations equilibrium. 
In such an equilibrium, real balances converge asymptotically to z* with positive 
probability. On the other hand, if, after some finite number of periods, one sets to 
zero the probabil ity that z,+ 1 = z* when z, # z*, there is also necessarily a positive 
probabil ity of the level of real balances converging asymptotical ly to zero. 6 9 
Nor  are these the only possible kinds of equilibria in which real balances become 
arbitrarily small with positive probabil ity. It is possible for there to be zero 
probabil ity of z, converging to zero, and yet a positive probabil ity of zt being some 
of the time lower than any given positive quantity. For  example, the process {zt} 
may be a random walk on the sequence of values {2.} for n = . . . ,  - 2, - 1, 0, 1, 2,. . .  
That is, we may imagine that {zt} is a Markov  process, such that whenever z~ = ~,, 
zt + 1 = 2, + 1 with probabil ity 1/2 
z,+ 1 = 2._ 1 with probabil ity 1/2 
Such a process satisfies (2.1) if for each n, 
(2.6) F(~,) - [G(i ,_  1) + G(2,+ 1)] 
2(1 + re) 
Suppose that there exists a sequence {2,} satisfying (2.6) such that, in addition, 
2, + t > 2. for all n, with 2, approaching zero as n approaches - oo and approaching 
z* as n approaches + ~.7 Then (2.2) is satisfied as well, and one has a REE in which 
there is probabil ity zero of a sequence of sunspot events such that z, converges to 
zero as t becomes large. Yet for any e > 0, there exists an integer N such that 2. < 
for all n < N, and hence z~ < ~ infinitely often, with probabil ity one. 
If instead of (2.4) one has the opposite, i.e., 
(2.4') lim [V*(c)/V*(c)] < fl- 1(1 + it) 
c~O 
then no perfect foresight equilibria exist in which real balances converge to zero. 
For (2.4.') implies that the graph of (2.5) converges to the origin with a slope greater 
than one, so that there exists a z' > 0 such that for any 0 < zt < z', (2.5) has only 
solutions with z t + 1 > zt. But (2.4') does not suffice to rule out stochastic equilibria 
in which real balances become arbitrarily low with positive probabil ity, since even 
6 This method of constructing sunspot equilibria in a case where there exists a continuum of perfect 
foresight equilibria was first employed by Shell (1977) in the context of an overlapping generations model; 
Peck (1988) shows that the construction works for a broader class of overlapping generations models 
as well. 
7 It is possible to establish under certain additional conditions that such a sequence exists; see Chiappori 
and Guesnerie (1988), who consider a difference quation of a similar form, derived from an overlapping 
generations model. One needs only to establish the existence of a heteroclinic orbit for the discrete-time 
dynamical system (2.6), linking the two steady states at 0 and z*. 
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when 0 < zt < z', it is always possible to find a solution to (2.1) in which 0 < zt+ ~ < z~ 
with positive probability, as long as that probability need not be close to one. 
The above result might make it seem that, at least if one restricts one's attention 
to perfect foresight equilibria, the existence of self-fulfilling inflations is dependent 
upon the existence of a low rate of money growth; for when the left hand side of 
(2.4') is finite, this inequality says that rc is less than a certain critical value. But such 
a conclusion would be misleading, for often (2.4) will be necessary for the existence 
of any equilibrium at all with valued fiat money; and a policy that achieves 
determinacy ofthe equilibrium value of money only by forcing that value to be zero 
would probably not be desirable (given that this would mean that no cash goods 
could ever be consumed). Often the entire graph of (2.5) will lie below the diagonal 
unless (2.4) holds. For example, if V*(c) is monotonically decreasing while V*(c) is 
monotonically increasing - as will be the case if (A3) holds - then (2.5) implies 
z,+ 1/z, = (1 + ~/fl)[V*((min(z,+ 1, cl)))/V*((min(z,, ci)))] 
> (1 + u/fl)lim V*(c)/V*(c) 
c--*0 
so that (2.4') would imply that the graph lies entirely above the diagonal. But then 
any perfect foresight equilibrium with valued fiat money would have to be a mono- 
tonically increasing sequence {zt}, and this, as is discussed further below, will violate 
(2.2) in the case of any ~ > 0. Hence rates of money growth high enough to violate 
(2.4), assuming that these are non-negative rates of money growth, would result in 
non-existence of perfect foresight monetary equilibrium. In fact, one can show that 
it would result in non-existence of any monetary equilibrium. And in cases in which 
monetary equilibrium is possible in the presence of such a high rate of money 
growth, there will often be an infinite number of such equilibria, albeit not involving 
self-fulfilling inflations; hence a policy of high money growth would not result in 
uniqueness of monetary equilibrium. 
In what follows I restrict attention to the range of rales of money growth for 
which (2.4) is satisfied (which may include extremely high rates). Then one is assured 
of the existence of monetary equilibrium, at least for all rates of money growth 
~r >_ fl - 1, by Proposition 1. 
If (A4) also holds, a continuum of inflationary equilibria will exist for any rate 
of money growth, so that the rate of money growth has in this sense no consequence 
for the issue of indeterminacy. However, it should be noted that too low a rate of 
money growth can force a self-fulfilling inflation to occur, in the sense that for low 
rates of money growth this may be the only kind of monetary equilibrium that is 
possible. 
Proposition 3. Suppose that preferences and the rate of money growth satisfy 
(A 1)-(A4), and that the rate of money growth satisfies (2.4) with z: < fl - 1. Then the 
only equilibria that exist involve real balances converging to zero with probability 
one. 
Proofi The concavity of V implies that V*(ca)> V*(cl) for all c I < C1' while 
V*;(cl) = V~(cx) for all e I > ~,. Then if z~ < fl - 1, F(z) < (fl/1 + g)G(z) for all z > 0. 
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As a result, (2.1) implies 
F(zt) = (fl/1 + rc)Et[G(Zt+ l) ] >_ Et[V(zt+ l) ] 
so that the random variable {F(zt)} is a supermartingale. This property plus the 
fact that F(z,) > 0 with probability one implies, by the submartingale convergence 
theorem (e.g., Loeve, 1978, p. 59), that the sequence {F(zt)} converges with probabi- 
lity one. Condition (2.1) also implies 
(fl/1 + n)Et[O(z,) ] > F(z,) = (fill + n)Et[O(z,+ ,)] 
so that {G(z,)} is a supermartingale as well. Then since G(z,) > 0 with probability, 
the sequence {G(zt) } also converges with probability one. 
Now define random variables 
X,+ 1 = (,6/1 + rc)G(zt+ 1) - F(z,) 
Y~ = (fill + ~) G(zt) - V(zt) 
It follows from the above that these variables converge with probability one as well, 
and that the sequences ofrandom variables [{X,}, t = 1,2 .... ] and [{ It}, t = 0, 1 .... ] 
both converge almost surely to the same random variable X~. Furthermore, since 
E,[Xs] = 0 for all s > t, by (2.1), Et[Xo~] = 0 with probability one for all t, so that 
X~ = 0 with probability one. But as noted above, Y, > 0 in any period in which 
z, > 0. So the fact that Y, converges to the value zero with probability one implies 
that z~ converges to the value zero with probability one. (This is however only 
possible if lira [(fl/1 + rc)G(z)- F(z)] =0; if the limit is positive, then we have a 
z~O 
contradiction and no monetary equilibrium of any kind is possible.) m 
As with the Bewley (1983) example of non-existence of monetary equilibrium 
with a bounded price level, the problem is that too high a rate of return on money 
is simply inconsistent with equilibrium, and if the monetary authority insists on 
contracting the money supply at such a rate the result must be that prices will not 
in equilibrium fall as fast as the money supply, with the result that the economy 
must eventually be "demonetized" (real balances go to zero), just as it would be by 
an extremely high rate of money growth. Such equilibria are of course undesirable 
(for the consumption of cash goods must eventually go to zero), compared to 
monetary equilibria in which real balances remain forever bounded away from zero, 
even if in the latter equilibria the level of real balances is suboptimal. Hence if one 
compares alternative rates of money growth according to the level of utility received 
by the representative consumer in the best equilibrium consistent with a given rate 
of money growth, one would, under the conditions just described, judge rates of 
money growth higher than (but not too much higher than) that called for by the 
Friedman Rule better than any rate of money growth rc < fl - 1. 
Of course this result does not contradict the Friedman proposition, insofar as 
the best rate of money growth under that criterion would still be ~z = fl - 1. But it 
would not be true that lower rates of money growth are always better, and there 
would be the danger of forcing the economy into a very bad equilibrium if the rate 
of contraction of the money supply were chosen even slightly too high. Taking into 
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account he imperfect knowledge of policymakers one would surely not want to 
aim at the exact optimum. Furthermore, it seems likely that in a more complicated 
model, with stochastic endowments or preferences, the problem of non-existence of 
equilibria in which real balances remain bounded away from zero could occur at 
even higher rates of money growth, as Bewley showed in the case of his model. 
On the other hand, self-fulfilling inflations need not be possible, even when (2.4) 
is satisfied. Instead of (A4), let us now consider the opposite case: 
(A5) lim cV*(c) > 0 
C--*O 
This is the sort of condit ion discussed by Scheinkman (1980), who justifies it as a 
representation f the idea that real balances play an essential role in the economy. 8 
Let us also now assume: 
(A6) lim c V~(c) = 0 
c~O 
Note that (A6) is a consequence of (A4), but holds much more generally. For 
example, (A6) is also a consequence of (A3). 
Proposition 4. If preferences satisfy (A5), then there exists a lower bound z > 0 
such that z t > _z at all times in any monetary equilibrium. 9 Thus self-fulfilling 
inflations are impossible. If all of the premises of Proposit ion 3 are satisfied, except 
that (A5) replaces (A4), then monetary equil ibrium does not exist for ~r < fl - 1. 
Proof: Condit ion (A5) implies that 
lim G(z) > 0 
Z~0 
Then because G is continuous, positive for all z > 0, and monotonical ly increasing 
for all z > ~1, one must have 
_G = inf G(z) > 0 
z>0 
It follows from (2.1) that in any monetary equil ibrium 
(2.7) F(z,) = (fl/1 + 7t)Et[G(z,+ 1)3 >- (fl/1 + re)G_ 
s A similar condition is discussed inthe context of a representative-consumer cash-in-advance model 
by Carmichael (undated, section 5). 
9 It is important to note here that by a "monetary equilibrium" I mean a stochastic process for the price 
level which implies the existence ofa well-defined price level at all times, so that situations are ruled out 
in which zt ever comes to equal zero. One might want to extend the definition of equilibrium so that 
processes in which money might at some point in time become (and ever after emain) completely 
valueless would be considered possible quilibria even if equations such as (2.1) do not hold in such 
cases. In this case the conditions assumed in this proposition eed not rule out such equilibria. As a 
result, here would always exist sunspot equilibria whenever there xist monetary equilibria of any kind, 
in the case of any of the policy regimes considered in this section (that specify an exogenous growth path 
for the money supply to be achieved through lump sum taxes or transfers). Uniqueness ofequilibrium 
would not be obtained even under the hypotheses of Proposition 9below. 
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at all times. Now (A3) implies (A6) and hence that 
lim F(z) = 0 
z~0 
Because F is continuous and positive for all z > 0, there must exist a z > 0 such that 
F(z) < (fl/1 + ~z)G_ 
for all z < z. Then (2.7) implies that z, > z at all times. 9 
In the remainder of section 2, I maintain assumption (A5), in order to set aside 
the possibility of self-fulfilling inflations and consider the other types of multiplicities 
of equilibria that may nonetheless exist. 
(b ) Self-fulfilling deflations 
When (A4) is not assumed, it is sometimes useful to consider the following weaker 
version: 
(AV) lim cV*(c) < 0o 
c~0 
Proposition 5. Let preferences satisfy (A 1)-(A2) and either (A6) or (A7). Then if 
n > 0, there exists an upper bound ~ < 0o such that z, _< ~/ at all times in any 
equilibrium. Thus self-fulfilling deflations are impossible. On the other hand, if 
0 > n > fl - l, then there exists a continuum of perfect foresight equilibria in which 
the level of real balances becomes unboundedly large asymptotically, and also an 
infinite number of sunspot equilibria in which this occurs asymptotically with 
positive probability. (There are an infinite number in which the probability is one 
and an infinite number in which it is positive but less than one.) Many of the sunspot 
equilibria involve a stochastic allocation of resources as well as stochastic variations 
in the price level, although the allocation of resources i the same in all periods in 
which z, >_ cl. Ifn = fl - 1 exactly, then there do not exist perfect foresight equilibria 
in which real balances asymptotically become unbounded, but there exists a 
continuum of perfect foresight equilibria, and for any finite upper bound, there exists 
a continuum of equilibria in which the level of real balances remains permanently 
above that level (see Proposition 1). There also exist an infinite number of sunspot 
equilibria in this case, and for any finite upper bound, there exist an infinite number 
of sunspot equilibria in which there is a positive probability of real balances 
eventually exceeding and remaining forever above that bound. 
Proof: 1~ Let n _> fl - 1, and define 
z - in f{z>OF(z )> fl inf G(z')} 
- 1 + nz '>O 
Since z > 81 implies F(z) = G(z) > (fl/1 + n) G(z), one must have z < 81. Note also 
lo I am indebted toTeh-Ming Huo for a suggestion that improved this proof. 
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F(zt) < inf G(z') < Et[G(zt+ 1)] 
i +n2">o l+x  
2= max{ fl 1 sup G(z), d~} 
1 +~V*(c , )  ~>o 
"" ~- z__<z<~" 
If (A7) holds, 2 is obviously finite. One the other hand, if (A7) does not hold, 
inf G(z') > 0 
z'>O 
Since in this case (A6) is assumed to hold, F(z) approaches zero as z tends to zero, 
from which it follows that z > 0. Then the fact that G(z) is continuous on the compact 
interval [z, cl] implies that 2 < oo. Thus either (A6) or (A7) implies that 2 is finite. 
The definition of 2 furthermore implies that for all z > 0 in the interval [z, ~1], 
(2.8) G(z) <_ (1 + n/fl) V*(~1)2 
One also observes that for all Cl < z < 2, 
- -  ~ ^ 
G(Z) : zV~(Cl)  _~ ZVl(C1) ~ (1 + rc/fl) V*(~x)2 
Thus (2.8) holds for all z > 0 in the interval z < z < 2. 
Now suppose that at some date zt > i. It follows that 
fl z,V*(~l) = F(zt) = Et[G(z,+ 1)] 
l+r r  
fl 
Pt(zt+l <_ ~)Et[G(zt+ 1)[zt+ 1~ z] 
l+~z 
+ fl Pt(zt+ a > z)Et[G(zt+ 1)]zt+ 1 )" Z] 
l+g  
<_ Pt(zt+i <_ 2)2V~(d I) + 
fl 
Pt(zt+ 1 > z)Et[zt+ 11zt+ 1 > Z] V~(C1) 
1+~ 
fl < 2V*(~1) + E,[max(z, +1 - i, 0)] V*(~ 1) 
l+n  
where Pt(...) denotes probability of the event in question conditional upon I t. 
In deriving these equalities and inequalities I have used (2.1), (2.8), and the fact that 
zt+ 1 > z with probability one. Then for any value ofzt,  it follows that 
Et[max(zt+ 1 - 2, 0)] > (1 + n/fl) max (z, - 2, 0) 
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As a result, z _> 0 would imply that 
lim flT E t [max(z  T -- ~., 0)] = oo 
T~oo 
whenever zt > i. But since G(ZT) > V*(Ol)max (z r - i, 0), this would mean 
lim flT Et[  G(ZT) ] = oO 
T-o~ 
as well, violating (2.2). Hence if rc _> 0, there can be no equil ibrium in which z, > 
at any date or under any contingency. 
Self-fulfilling deflations are however possible if 0 > z >__ ~-  1. To see this it 
suffices to consider the possibility of equilibria in which z~ _> dl at all times (i.e., in 
which the cash-in-advance constraint is never binding). In this case (2.1) and (2.2) 
reduce to 
(2.9) z, = (/~/1 + n) E,[z, +l]  
(2.10) lim flT Et[z T] ~- 0 
T~oo 
A perfect foresight (deterministic) solution to (2.9) is any sequence of the form 
z, = (1 + z/~)'Zo 
which satisfies z t > dl forever if z o > Ol, given that n >/~ - 1. Such a sequence also 
satisfies (2.10) if Tr < 0. Hence in this case there exists a continuum of perfect foresight 
equilibria 11, one for each possible value of Zo > dl. If n>/~-1 ,  each of these 
involves real balances that asymptotical ly become unbounded, while if n =/~ - 1, 
each is a deterministic steady state. 
Stochastic solutions to (2.9) and (2.10) are also easily constructed. Note that for 
any zt > d~, n >/~ - 1 implies that one can find an infinite number of non-degenerate 
distributions for Z~+l over the interval z~+ ~ > ~1, such that (2.9) is satisfied. Hence 
one can recursively construct an extremely large number of stochastic processes 
satisfying (2.9) and with zt > ~ at all times, as in the proof of Proposit ion 2. If z < 0, 
(2.9) implies that (2.10) must hold as well, so that all of these are REE. If n >/~ - 1, 
one can use a martingale convergence argument as in the proof of Proposit ion 3 to 
show that in any equil ibrium of this kind, real balances asymptotically become 
unboundedly large with probabil ity one. 
On the other hand, one can also construct sunspot equilibria in which the pro- 
bability of that outcome is positive but less than one. Consider, for example, stochastic 
processes {zt} in which if z, > d 1, and t < T, Zt+ 1 =(1 + z /a f l )z  t - (1 - o~/~)z* with 
probabil ity 0 < a < 1, and zz+ 1 = z* with probabil ity (1 - 0~). If  z~ = z*, z,+ 1 = z* 
with probabil ity one. Since (1 + z/aft)  z, - (1 - a/~)z* >_ ~1 whenever zt > ~1, this 
completely defines the process for t _< T, assuming an initial value Zo > dl. For  t > T, 
let zt+ ~ = (1 + z/E)  zr with probabil ity one if zt >_ dl, and z* with probabil ity one if 
11 This result is similar to Brock's (1975) in the ease of the model with money in the utility function. 
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z~ = z*. The process o constructed satisfies (2.1) in all periods, and satisfies (2.2) as 
well given n < 0. Note that there is a positive probability that zr+ 1 > dl, in which 
case real balances asymptotically grow without bound, but also a positive pro- 
bability that zr+ 1 =z*, in which case real balances are asymptotically equal 
to z*. 9 
A policy of steady contraction of the money supply leads to indeterminacy of
the equilibrium value of money because the schedule of lump sum tax liabilities 
associated with such a policy creates a desire for savings on the part of consumers 
that increases (in real terms) when the real value of money increases, because a
permanent (or at least not completely transitory) increase in the real value of money 
increases the real value of each consumer's future tax liabilities. A change in 
consumer expectations regarding the real value of future tax liabilities can be 
self-fulfillino in that by motivating an increased emand for real balances it increases 
the equilibrium value of the existing money supply and so the real value of the fixed 
schedule of nominal tax payments. 11 
On the other hand, it is possible for monetary equilibrium to be unique in the 
case of all non-negative rates of money growth. This is shown by the discussion 
following Proposition 6 below. 
( c ) Bounded endogenous fluetuations 
There remains to be considered the possibility of bounded endogenous fluctuations. 
In some cases one can rule out equilibria of this kind. 
Proposition 6. Suppose that preferences satisfy (A1)-(A3), and also 
(A8) The function cV*(c) is monotonically increasing in C. 13 
Then bounded endogenous fluctuations are impossible. That is, if there is a rational 
expectations equilibrium in which the level of real balances i forever bounded above 
and also bounded away from zero, it must be a monetary steady state, i.e., an 
equilibrium in which z~ = z* forever with probability one, where z* > 0 is a solution 
to (2.3). Note also that if such a steady state exists, it is unique, by Proposition 1. 
So there can be at most one equilibrium with a forever bounded level of real 
balances. 
Proof: Suppose that there exist upper and lower bounds 0 < z < ~ < ~ such that 
z < z t < ~ forever with probability one. Consider first the case in which there exists 
12 This result shows that the sufficient conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium given by Lucas and 
Stokey (1987)work only because they restrict attention to stationary Markovian equilibria; their 
definition of equilibrium rules out both self-fulfilling inflations and self-fulfilling deflations by assumption. 
Equilibrium involving aforever bounded level of real balances can be unique even in the case of a negative 
rate of money growth, as is shown by Proposition 6 below. 
13 Condition (A8) holds ifincome ffects are not too strong, and implies that the demand for real balances 
associated with different steady rates of inflation will be a monotonically decreasing function of the rate 
of inflation - a proposition for which there is considerable support in the empirical literature. Note that 
(A8) also implies (A7). 
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a steady state with _z < z* < i. Define recursively the sequences {zj} and {ij} by 
F(zj+ 1) = (fl/1 + rc) G~_j) 
_z o = _z 
F(~j+ 1) = (~/1 + ~) G(~j) 
Zo =z  
Because of (A3), F(z) is a monotonically increasing function, and because of (A8), 
G(z) is as well. Hence both series are well-defined, and for all j, 
zj<z_j+l <z* <zj+l  <z j  
It follows that both series must converge to z*. Now for any j, ifzj < z, forever with 
probability one, it follows from the monotonicity of G that G~j) < G(zt+ 1) forever 
with probability one. Then (2.1) implies that F(zj+l) = (/~/1 + rc)G(~j) < (/~/1 + ~z) 
G(zt + 1) = F(zt); and the monotonicity ofF then implies that z_j + 1 < zt forever as well. 
Iterating, one thus shows that if _z < z t forever, z* < z t forever. One can similarly 
show that if z~ < ~j forever with probability one, then z t < ~j+ 1 forever as well, and 
iterating, one shows that if z, _< ~ forever, then z, < z* forever. Combining these 
results, one must have z~ = z* forever. 
If there does not exist a monetary steady state z* within the interval ~, ~], then 
the argument proceeds as above, except hat for some finite j one will cease to be 
able to solve for either zj or ~j within the interval [z, ~]. This results in a 
contradiction, so that in this case no equilibrium exists with the asserted upper and 
lower bounds. 9 
This result establishes a class of cases in which a high enough rate of money 
growth suffices to insure uniqueness of monetary equilibrium. Suppose that 
preferences satisfy (A1)-(A3), (A5), and (A8). Then for any rate of money growth 
rc > 0, the steady state z* (the unique solution to (2.3)) is the only monetary 
equilibrium; perfect foresight equilibrium is unique and sunspot equilibria are 
impossible, by Propositions 4, 5, and 6. But for any rate of money growth 
0 > It >/~ - 1 (the only rates of contraction of the money supply for which any 
monetary equilibrium exists, by Proposition 4), there exists a continuum of 
non-steady-state p rfect foresight equilibria and an infinite number of sunspot 
equilibria as well (by Proposition 5). 
But even when one can rule out both self-fulfilling inflations and self-fulfilling 
deflations (e.g., because (A5) and (A6) hold and rc > 0), monetary equilibrium may 
be indeterminate. The following proposition states a simple sufficient condition 
which, while not necessary, is useful for constructing examples. 
Proposition 7. Suppose that there exists a steady state monetary equilibrium z* 
at which 
(2.11) IF(z*)/a(z*)l <///(1 + ~) 
Then for any neighborhood N of z*, there exists a continuum of perfect foresight 
equilibria in which zteN for all t, and also an infinite number of sunspot equilibria 
with that property. The sunspot equilibria include an infinite number of stationary 
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sunspot equilibria, i.e., sunspot equilibria in which z, follows a stationary stochastic 
process. 
Proof: The existence of a continuum of perfect foresight equilibria converging t,o 
the steady state given (2.11) is a consequence of the techniques of local analysis used 
by authors uch as Kehoe and Levine (1985). The existence of an infinite number 
of stationary sunspot equilibria involving small fluctuations around the steady state 
can be shown in a number of ways. The existence of an infinite set of such equilibria 
in which {z,} follows a two-state Markov process can be demonstrated using any 
of several techniques described in Guesnerie and Woodford (1991). The existence 
of stationary sunspot equilibria in the present model is discussed explicitly in 
Woodford (1986). 9 
Stationary sunspot equilibria may be of particular interest because they can 
represent limit points of reasonable types of disequilibrium learning processes, as 
shown in Woodford (1990a) for the case of an overlapping enerations model. Also 
note that in such cases the importance of the sunspot fluctuations will not be 
decreasing over time. 
Condition (2.11) can easily be shown to be consistent with all of the assumptions 
regarding preferences discussed above, including (A3), with the exception of (A8). 
(Evidently (A8) implies that (2.11) must not hold, or Propositions 6 and 7 would be 
inconsistent.) Condition (2.11) is also consistent with arbitrary rates of money 
growth, in the sense that for any desired value of n, one can choose V so that (2.11) 
holds. However, for a fixed utility function V, it seems that bounded endogenous 
fluctuations are more likely to occur (if they occur for any values of 7r) in the case 
of lower rates of money growth. This can be proved in the case of additively 
separable preferences. 
Proposition 8. Suppose that preferences satisfy (A1)-(A3), and 
(A9) The function cV~(c) is monotonically increasing in c, for c close enough to 
zero. 14 
Then there exists a rate of money growth n*, strictly less than ~, which in turn is 
defined by 
1 + ~ = lim ~[V*(c)/V~(c)], 
c~0 
and such that for any rate of money growth in the interval re* ___ n < ~, the unique 
steady state monetary equilibrium is the only rational expectations equilibrium in 
which the level of real balances remains forever bounded both above and away from 
zero. Thus bounded endogenous fluctuations are impossible. (For rates of money 
growth n _> ~, no monetary equilibria are possible at all, from the discussion 
following Proposition 2, for in this case (2.4) ceases to hold.) 
Proof: Condition (A9) implies that G(z) is an increasing function for small positive 
values of z. If G(2) continues to be a monotonically increasing function for all 
~a Note that (A9) is a considerable weakening of(A8), and in particular is consistent with (2.11), but still 
implies (A7). 
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0 < z < ~1, then the result follows from Proposition 6. Let us suppose instead that 
it does not. Then there exists a value 0 < z < dl, at which G(z) has its first local 
maximum. In this case, let n* be defined by (1 + n*) =/3G(z)/F(z). Note that n* < r~; 
for given (A3), G(z)/F(z) must be monotonically decreasing for all 0 < z < z. Then 
for all rates of money growth in the range n* _< n < ~, there exists a unique steady 
state z* which lies in the interval 0 < z* _< z, and both F(z) and G(z) are monotoni- 
cally increasing functions over the interval 0 < z < z*. 
Now define G(z) = max G(x). Then G is a non-decreasing function, and G(z) 
X_.<g 
> G(z) for all z. Hence G(z) < G(~) for all 0 < z < ~, in the case of any upper bound 
~. Futhermore, F(z) > (/3/1 + zr)G(z) for all z > z*. For if there were any point z for 
which this were not true, there would have to exist some z*< z '< z at which 
(/3/1 + 7c)G(z') > F(z). But, because F is monotonically increasing, this would imply 
(/3/1 + rc)G(z') > F(z'). This is impossible for any z' >z*, because G(z)/F(z) is 
monotonically decreasing in z for all 0 < z < ~1. On the other hand, if z' = z*, one 
would have z > z' and as a result F(z) > F(z') = (/3/1 + n)G(z'), again a contradiction. 
Suppose now that there exists a finite upper bound ~ > z* such that z t + 1 < 
forever with probability one. Then (/3/1 + rOG(zt+l)< (/3/1 + n)(~(~) forever with 
probability one, so that (2.1) implies that F(zt) < (/3/1 + 7z)G(~) forever with proba- 
bility one as well. Define recursively the sequence {~j} by 
F(~j+ 1) = (/3/1 + ~)~(~j) 
Zo = 
For any ~j > z*, the above equation has a unique solution z*< z-~+l < ~j. The 
sequence {~j} accordingly must converge to some limiting value ~ such that 
F(~) = (/3/1 + rc)G(~), which can only occur for ~ = z* as shown above. Now the fact 
that F(z,) < (/3/1 + ~)(~(~) forever withprobability one implies that zt < ~1 forever. 
But then (/3/1 + n)G(z,+x)< (/3/1 + n)G(z~) forever with probability one, so that 
F(z,) < (/3/1 + n)G(~l) forever, which implies that z, < ~2 forever. Proceeding iter- 
atively, z, < ;~j forever, for all j, and hence zt < z* forever with probability one. 
But on the interval 0 < z < z*, G(z) is monotonically increasing, and so at this 
point the proof of Proposition 6applies. Then any rational expectations equilibrium 
in which z, is also bounded away from zero forever must have z, = z* forever with 
probability one.~S 9 
Proposition 9. Suppose that preferences satisfy (A1)-(A3), (A5), (A9), and 16 
(A10) lim [V*(c)/V*(c) ] >/3-1 
c---~ 0 
xs This result is similar to one demonstrated by Grandmont (1986) in the case of an overlapping 
generations model. Apart from the difference in the model considered here (which does not result in a 
significantly different ype of equilibrium conditions, for purposes of the question addressed in this 
proposition), the present result is stronger insofar as Grandmont establishes uniqueness only within the 
class of stationary Markovian equilibria. 
16 Condition (A10) states that rc > 0, so that by Proposition 1a steady state monetary equilibrium exists 
in the case of a constant money supply. 
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Then for all rates of money growth in the interval 
max(0, 7r*) < zt < 
the monetary steady state is the unique monetary equilibrium. Thus a high enough 
rate of money growth (as long as it is not so high as to prevent the existence of any 
monetary equilibrium at all) guarantees uniqueness. 
Proof: This follows immediately from Propositions 4,5, and 8 above. 9 
Thus there exist economies for which there exists a large multiplicity of perfect 
foresight equilibria and a large set of sunspot equilibria, for all rates of money 
growth that are low enough (within the range in which there exists any monetary 
equilibria t all), but for which the steady state monetary equilibrium isthe unique 
equilibrium, for all rates of money growth that are high enough (again, within the 
range in which there exists any monetary equilibria t all). Furthermore, the rate 
of money growth such that equilibrium isindeterminate forall lower rates of money 
growth may be positive; to construct such an example, one need only choose autility 
function V satisfying the hypotheses ofProposition 9and such that (2.11) holds for 
~z = 0. In any event, the range of money growth rates for which indeterminacy results 
will almost always include all rates 7r < 0, and so indeterminacy and the possibility 
of sunspot equilibria will necessarily become a problem for all rates of money growth 
approaching that advoeated by Friedman. This would appear to pose a problem 
for the use of a policy of the kind advocated by Friedman to achieve the optimal 
allocation of resources. 
3. Interest rate pegging policies 
Another class of monetary-fiscal policy regimes of great interest involve the 
government s anding ready to exchange money for securities in whatever amounts 
are demanded by the private sector at the relative price chosen by the government, 
so as to peg the equilibrium nominal rate of interest. Such a policy should obviously 
be of interest, if, following Friedman's (1969) argument, one seeks to reduce the 
inefficiency associated with the existence of a rate of return differential between 
money and securities; for since the distortion identified by Friedman is caused by 
positive nominal interest rates rather than by money growth or inflation as such, a 
policy that is framed in terms of a target path for nominal interest rates might seem 
the most straightforward approach. The results of the previous ection, showing 
that an exogenously specified rate of contraction of the money supply as called for 
by Friedman results in price level indeterminacy, the existence of sunspot equilibria, 
and the possibility of equilibrium allocations of resources other than the optimal 
steady state allocation aimed at by Friedman, provide a ground for interest in 
whether any other type of policy regime might make possible an equilibrium with 
low nominal interest rates without also resulting in determinacy. But even apart 
from this consideration (e.g., even supposing that there were a unique equilibrium 
associated with each possible choice of an exogenously given path for the money 
supply), a policy of interest rate pegging would be appealing in that very little 
information about he structure of the economy would appear to be necessary for 
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implementation f the optimal policy; for one can say for an extremely broad class 
of models that a zero nominal interest rate is necessary for monetary equilibrium 
to be efficient, w The target path for the money supply needed to bring about 
efficiency might, on the other hand, be complex and depend upon many details of 
the true model of the economy - if, for example, the equilibrium real rate of interest 
and the money demand schedule are time-varying rather than constant as assumed 
by Friedman. 
Direct interest rate pegging is not, however, often advocated as a way of 
achieving the efficiency gains expected to follow from low nominal interest rates. 
Objections to policies of this kind are of two basic sorts. Some (such as Friedman 
(1968), developing an argument that dates back to Wicksell) have argued that an 
attempt to peg interest rates at a low nominal rate through open market operations 
or discount window policy would in fact eventually prove unsustainable, and result 
in higher nominal interest rates after abandonment of the peg, due to the high rate 
of inflation that would by then have developed. This account asserts that the initial 
effect of a move to such a policy (after a period of higher nominal interest rates) 
would be a situation of expectational disequilibrium in which inflation at a rate 
higher than savers are anticipating would temporarily make possible the coincidence 
of low nominal interest rates with high money growth (due to the purchases of 
securities by the government in its efforts to keep their price high) and consequent 
inflation; but, he argues, such a discrepancy between actual and expected inflation 
cannot be maintained for too long. If this argument is thought to imply that a policy 
of pegging nominal interest rates cannot work when consumers have rational 
expectations, then the analysis below contradicts it; for I show that in the present 
model there exists a perfect foresight equilibrium corresponding to each possible 
choice of a nominal interest rate peg, no matter how low, in which the government 
succeeds in keeping the nominal interest rate at that level forever. Such a result may 
not settle the matter for an adherent of the Wicksellian view. He might argue that 
the peg would not work exactly because people cannot be counted upon to correctly 
anticipate the rational exceptations equilibrium path; Howitt (1992), for example, 
argues that convergence ofa disequilibrium learning process to rational expectations 
equilibrium ay fail in the case of an interest rate peg but succeed in the case of an 
exogenous growth path for the money supply. I will not take up this line of argument 
here, other than to question the justification for the assumption that the short run 
"liquidity" effects of monetary expansion represent a disequilibrium phenomenon. 
The reasoning would appear to be that, since one observes a short-run association 
of a decision to lower nominal interest rates with an increase in money growth, 
while one observes over the longer un (and simple models of steady state equili- 
brium predict) that higher sustained rates of money growth are associated with 
higher nominal interest rates, the former is a disequilibrium phenomenon while the 
latter epresents he economy's tendency over the long run to be near equilibrium. 
But this sort of reasoning equates "equilibrium" phenomena with the properties of 
static or steady state equilibria. In an intertemporal equilibrium model, it is easy 
w See Woodford (1990b) for further discussion. 
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for faster money growth to be associated with the initial transition to lower nominal 
interest rates, while the eventual consequence of keeping interest rates as that level 
is a low long run rate of money growth. 
The second sort of objection to interest rate pegging is consistent with (and 
indeed in its most sophisticated form depends upon) an assumption of rational 
expectations about inflation. This argument asserts that such a policy regime makes 
the price level indeterminate, r sulting in the possibility not only of inflation or 
deflation without bound at the time that such a policy regime is initiated, but of 
continuing unexpected fluctuations of the price level in response to "sunspot" 
events. (See, e.g., Sargent and Wallace (1975) and Sargent (1979, pp. 92-95).) The 
argument is as follows. The level of money prices is determined by the requirement 
that the real value of the nominal money supplied by the central bank be equal to 
the private sector's demand for real balances, which will depend upon the nominal 
interest rate as well as upon factors uch as the level of real economic activity. If 
the money supply rule is simply to supply as large a nominal quantity as is 
demanded given a certain ominal interest rate, then this relation leaves the money 
price level indeterminate insofar as a higher price level would still equate money 
supply and demand if a proportionately higher quantity of money were supplied, 
as it would be under the policy regime described. Nor do any other equilibrium 
conditions resolve this indeterminacy (at least in the IS-LM model considered by 
Sargent and Wallace), for the current price level enters them only insofar as some 
of them involve the expected rate of inflation (in particular, the relation between 
the level of nominal interest rates and the saving and investment determinants of 
the equilibrium real rate), and so an arbitrary change in the current price level would 
still be consistent with equilibrium as long as the expected future price level were 
increased proportionately. This in turn is consistent with rational expectations 
equilibrium given that he future price level is similarly indeterminate, if the nominal 
interest rate peg is to be maintained forever. Indeterminacy of this kind would be 
undesirable, as discussed above, especially if unexpected inflation distorts the 
allocation of resources due to the existence of a "Lucas supply curve", for in this 
case "sunspot" fluctuations in the price level would result in unnecessary deviations 
of equilibrium supply from the full-information level. 
But indeterminacy of the kind discussed by Sargent and Wallace, due to an exact 
homogeneity of the equilibrium conditions in the sequence of price levels given a 
policy of pegging the nominal interest rate, will in fact almost never exist in a 
complete general equilibrium odel, as opposed to the sort of Keynesian aggregative 
model that hey consider. For there are many reasons for the equilibrium conditions 
to not be perfectly homogeneous even in the case of an interest rate peg. First of 
all, even in the case that variations in the money supply are to be brought about 
entirely through lump sum taxes or transfers, it will usually be reasonable toassume 
a fixed distribution of lump sum taxes or transfers across consumers, that will in 
general not coincide with the distribution of previous money balances across 
consumers that happens to exist. As a result he increase or decrease inthe aggregate 
money supply that would be necessary to accommodate a given change in the 
current price level would change the distribution of money balances across 
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consumers, and so would in general have a real effect on the economy.18 Secondly, 
in the case that the variations in the money supply are to be brought about hrough 
open market operations (with the schedule of tax collections being unaffected) rather 
than through taxes or transfers (with the outstanding overnment debt being 
unaffected), the homogeneity result will not be true even for a representative 
consumer model. For the increase or decrease in the money supply that would be 
necessary to accommodate a given change in the current price level carries with it 
a change in the net indebtedness of the government tothe private sector, which will 
affect he budget constraints of consumers and so have a real effect on the economy. 
(Both of these kinds of effects are ignored in the IS-LM model used by Sargent and 
Wallace. There are of course no possible distributional effects in an aggregative 
model of that kind; and there are also no consequencesof changes in net government 
indebtedness because the consumption/saving decision in that model does not 
depend upon consumers' intertemporal budget constraint.) It is this second source 
of inhomogeneity that is relevant for the representative consumer economy 
considered here.19 
Of course, the mere fact that exact homogeneity will almost never hold does not 
prove that there might not nonetheless be a severe indeterminacy of rational 
expectations equilibrium as a result of an interest rate peg. The complete set of 
equilibria consistent with a given policy regime is therefore worth analyzing, just 
as in the previous ection. In fact, I will show that in the case of at least one sort of 
interest rate peg, equilibrium is unique in the case of an interest rate target even 
though it would be indeterminate if the central bank tried to bring about the same 
equilibrium through a policy that specifies a target path for the money supply. 
The class of policy regimes to be considered here are interest-rate pegs (as 
discussed in section 1), defined by the choice of a constant nominal interest rate 
R _> 1 and a constant level of real net transfers h. Taking expected values of both 
sides of (1.14) conditional upon It, and substituting (1.4c) and (1.12) yields 
~(zt) 
Rt  = R(z t )  = - -  
F(z,) 
Under a policy regime that fixes a constant nominal interest rate, a requirement for 
"equilibrium is then that 
(3.1) R(z , )  = R 
a.d.a.c. 
18 See, e.g., Woodford (1987). 
19 This source of inhomogeneity s also the reason for the determinacy results of Begg and Haque (1984) 
and Auernheimer and Contreras (1990) in the context of a Sidrauski-Brock model, and of Sims (1994) 
in the context of a representative household model with real money balances as an argument of the 
"transactions technology." Leeper (1991) similarly obtains determinacy due to the intertemporal budget 
constraint in the case of a variety of types of interest rate policies, in the context of a linear model. I am 
indebted to Leonardo Auernheimer for calling my attention to the article by Begg and Haque. 
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Substituting this into (1.12) implies that the money supply and real balances 
evolve together so that 
(3.2) M; - ~ G(zt) = fiR Et[ MT+ ~ G(z, + 1)3 
Furthermore, (1.14) implies that 
q, = ff M~ G(zt) 
Mt G(zo) 
Substituting this into (1.13a), along with the fiscal policy rule 
Ht = h Mt 
2t 
and simplifying using (3.2) yields 
\ R . / j :o  f l jE'[G(zt+j)]=h L j 
Finally, substituting (1.13b) together with the same expression for net transfers into 
the government budget constraints (1.4a)-(1.4b) implies that net nominal assets 
{ Wt} evolve according to 
(3.4) Wt.+l = R W~ + [Rhz~- ' -- (R -- 1)]M t 
Note that Wt+ 1 is independent of any sunspot event at date t + 1; this follows from 
(1.13b), for Bt+ 1 is independent of such events, because the government trades only 
the non-contingent bond at date t. 
Thus in any equilibrium consistent with the interest rate peg, the processes {z t, 
Mr, W~} must satisfy conditions (3.1)-(3.4) a.d.a.c. This might seem too many 
conditions for any solution to exist in general; but it can be shown that (3.3)-(3.4) 
imply (3.2), so that there are only three independent conditions for each date and 
contingency. On the other hand, any triple of processes satisfying those conditions, 
with z~, M t > 0 a.d.a.c., represents a REE. For given such processes, one can uniquely 
determine {pt} from the relation p, = M#zt, {r,+ 1} from (1.14), {Bt+ 1} from (1.13b), 
and the consumption allocation from (1.11 a)-(1.11 b). The processes so constructed 
then satisfy all of the conditions given in Lemma 4 for a REE. Hence it suffices to 
consider the set of solutions to conditions (3.1) and (3.3)-(3.4). 
I first consider the case in which R > 1, and suppose that (3.1) has a unique 
solution, zt = z. Note that (A3) insures a unique solution for all 
(3.5) 1 < R < lim [V*(c)/V~(c)] 
c--*O 
which in that case is the complete range of values of R for which any solution exists 
at all. This result in fact applies whenever VI(c)/Vz(c ) is monotonically decreasing 
for all c. If this is not the case, there is nonetheless a unique solution for all 
(3.6) 1 <R < inf [  V*(c)] 
< ~ L v'~(c) J 
where ~ is the largest value of c at which V'~(c)/V*(c) is not a decreasing function 
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ofc. The strict concavity of V implies that V*(c)/V~(c) is greater than 1 for all c < dl, 
but equal to 1 at c = dl. Hence ? < ~1, and the rightmost term of (3.6) is greater than 
1. For values of R satisfying (3.6), solutions must lie in the interval ? < z < d~, and 
on this interval R(z) is a monotonically decreasing function. Because one is 
particularly interested in the consequences of pegging nominal interest rates at a 
low level, in order to reduce the inefficiency identified by Friedman, the case covered 
by (3.6) is surely the one of greatest interest. In this case, the following strong result 
is possible. 
Proposition I0. Let the nominal interest rate be pegged at a value R > 1, and 
suppose that (3.1) has a unique solution z > 0, either because R(z) is monotonic and 
R satisfies (3.5), or because R satisfies (3.6). In addition, let real net transfers (the 
real primary government budget deficit) be constant each period, at a level h such 
that 
R -1  
(3.7) h < --z 
R 
and let initial nominal wealth be W o > 0. 
Then there is a unique REE. It is a perfect foresight equilibrium (i.e., sunspots 
have no effect upon either prices or quantities) and can be described as follows: 
wt = Wo(1 + ~)' 
M, = #WoO + rt)' 
B,+~ = ( f i r  - ~) Wo(1 + ~)' 
p, = - Wo(1 + ~)' 
Z 
r t+ 1 =- R -1  
C l t  ~- g t ~ g 
C2t ~- y - -  Z 
where z > 0 is the unique solution to (3.1); the common rate 7t at which the money 
supply, the nominal quantity of government debt (or government credit), and the 
price level all grow is given by 
n=f lR - -1  
and where the constant share/~ > 0 of money in total nominal wealth is given by 
Proofi In this case, (3.1) implies that zt = z a.d.a.c., and substitution of this into 
(1.11a)-(1.11b) yields the constant consumption allocation indicated above. Note 
that the solution to (3.1) must satisfy 0 < z < y, so that real balances are always 
positive, and consumption of both "cash goods" and "credit goods" is always 
positive. Substitution of the constant level of real balances z into (3.3) yields 
M z = pW t 
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where the constant/~ has the value given above. Assumption (3.7) implies that # > 0. 
Substitution of this result into (3.4) in turn yields 
W~+ I =flRW, 
from which it follows that { Wt} grows at a constant rate, and the rate z is the one 
indicated above. 
Thus, given the initial condition W o, the entire path of {Wt} is determined, and 
is the one indicated. As it has been shown that the representative household always 
chooses money balances equal to a constant multiple of beginning-of-period 
nominal wealth, the entire path of {Mr} is similarly determined, and is the one 
indicated. As it has been shown that equilibrium real money balances are constant, 
the entire path of {Pt} is also determined, and is the one indicated. The equilibrium 
path for {Bt+~} is then determined by (1.13b), and that for {rt+l} by (1.14), so that 
each of these processes must be deterministic and follow the paths indicated. Hence 
no equilibrium ispossible other than the one indicated. On the other hand, this is an 
equilibrium, for conditions (3.1) and (3.3)-(3.4) are satisfied a.d.a.c. 9 
This proposition refers only to the case R > 1. The optimal steady state, of 
course, is the one with R = 1, and it is therefore of interest to ask what happens in 
this case. 
Proposition 11. Let the nominal interest rate be pegged at zero (i.e., R = 1) and 
suppose that real net transfers h < 0 (i.e., that the government collects taxes in excess 
of any transfers). In addition, let initial nominal wealth be Wo > 0. Then there are 
unique processes {Pt, rt+l, Wt, clt, c2t} associated with any REE. Each of these 
variables evolves deterministically as follows: 
W,= WoY 
p,= l__-f WoY 
rt+ 1 -~ 1 
Clt -7- e 1 
c2t = Y -- cl 
On the other hand, the processes {M t, Bt+ 1} are indeterminate. Specifically, there 
corresponds a REE to each possible money supply process atisfying the inequality 
1 
M, > -/~ Wo~/~' 
-h  
a.d.a.c., including those cases in which the money supply depends upon "sunspot" 
events. Corresponding to each possible choice of the money supply process is a 
unique process for outstanding government debt {B,+ 1}, such that 
Bt + i ~ Wo fit _ Mt 
a.d.a.c. 
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Proof: In the case R = 1, (3.1) does not have a unique solution, but is instead 
satisfied by any level of real balances consistent with the lower bound 
(3.8) zt > cl 
Nonetheless, ubstitution of (3.8) into (1.11 a)-(1.11 b) yields a unique equilibrium 
consumption allocation, as indicated. Furthermore, this consumption allocation 
implies that 
(3.9) G(z,) = Z 1 g~(c1) 
Substitution of this into (3.3) yields 
(3.10) 1 - fl _ W, 
-h  Pt 
so that the price level must be proportional to total nominal wealth at all times. 
Substituting this expression for the price level into (3.4) yields 
w,+l =/~w, 
from which it follows that {W~} grows at a constant rate. Then given the initial 
condition Wo, the path of {Wt} must be the one indicated, and so by (3.10) the path 
of {Pr} must be the one indicated as well. Substituting (3.9) into (1.14) yields 
r t  + 1 = flPr/P, + 1 
from which follows the path for {rr+ 1} indicated above. Thus the paths indicated 
for {Pr, r,+ 1, W, clr, c2r} are necessary for equilibrium. Given this path for {Pr}, (3.8) 
then implies that {Mr} must satisfy the lower bound indicated a.d.a.c. Finally, given 
any such process {Mr}, the process indicated for {Br} follows from the budget 
constraint (1.13b). 
Hence no equilibrium is possible other than the one indicated. But this is an 
equilibrium, for again conditions (3.1) and (3.3)-(3.4) are satisfied a.d.a.c. 9 
Thus the price level is uniquely determined under an interest rate peg, even in 
the case that the nominal interest rate is pegged at zero, though the demand for real 
balances becomes indeterminate in the latter case. Note also that the unique 
equilibrium that results from this sort of policy regime involves a steady state 
resource allocation as well as a steady state rate of inflation and level of nominal 
interest rates, that are the same as in the steady state equilibrium consistent with 
an exogenously specified money growth rate of z~. The difference is that an interest 
rate peg results in this being the unique equilibrium, while in the case of an 
exogenous money growth rate the equilibrium may be indeterminate; and for all 
zc <0, i.e., for all steady state nominal interest rates R <fl-1, equilibrium is 
necessarily indeterminate in the case of a constant growth rate rule. Thus in the case 
of exactly those steady states in which the welfare of the representative household 
is highest (including the optimal steady state), the interest rate peg is able to ensure 
the desired equilibrium while the constant money growth rate rule is not. 
Why do we not obtain price level indeterminacy, like Sargent and Wallace 
(1975)? Note that equilibrium conditions (3.1)-(3.4) do not exhibit he homogeneity 
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property responsible for their result. Equation (3.1) is analogous to an equation of 
their system, and the result hat the interest rate peg implies a uniquely determined 
equilibrium level of real balances is also consistent with their analysis. Equation 
(3.2) is also similar in form to an equation of their system that relates the current 
money supply and price level to the expected future price level, due to a "Fisher 
effect" of anticipated inflation on nominal interest rates and hence on liquidity 
preference. Both of these equations do exhibit the homogeneity property that 
characterizes the Sargent-Wallace system. That is, an arbitrary increase in the price 
level at some date t in response to a "sunspot" event would still be consistent with 
both of these conditions holding a.d.a.c., if the money supply increases in proportion 
to the price level in such an event, if the increases in both the price level and the 
money supply are permanent, and if there were a corresponding possibility of 
permanent reductions in the price level and the money supply if some other 
"sunspot" state had been realized instead. However (3.3) does not have this 
homogeneity property, as it involves the ratio of Mt to the initial nominal wealth 
Wt, that must be a predetermined state variable at date t (i.e., independent of any 
date t "sunspot" events) due to the government's not issuing or purchasing state- 
contingent bonds. It is the neglect of any equilibrium condition of this kind 
(resulting from the household's intertemporal budget constraint) hat accounts for 
the indeterminacy result of Sargent and Wallace. 
This is not to say that the result of Sargent and Wallace cannot be obtained in 
a general equilibrium framework; but it can be obtained only in a rather special 
case. The failure of homogeneity in (3.3) does depend upon the specification offiscal 
policy here; in particular, any process {Mr} satisfying (3.1)-(3.2) can be made to be 
an equilibrium consistent with an interest rate peg if net transfers {H~} are assumed 
to vary with the sunspot state in the way necessary to satisfy the intertemporal 
budget constraint. On the other hand, the kind of fiscal policy specification required 
to preserve homogeneity is a very special one; the particular case considered here 
(real net transfers constant over time and unaffected by the path of nominal 
variables) is simple to analyze but is hardly the only kind of specification for which 
the intertemporal budget constraint causes the equilibrium conditions to be 
inhomogeneous. 
Finally, note that while the equilibrium resulting from an interest rate peg 
involves a steady rate of money growth that is lower the lower the target nominal 
interest rate R (in accordance with a "Fisher equation"), the transition to a lower 
interest rate regime after a period of higher nominal interest rates may involve a 
temporary increase in money growth. Suppose that prior to some period T, interest 
rates have been pegged at a level R ~ (and as this policy had been expected to 
continue forever, the economy had been in the corresponding steady state), but that 
in period T it is learned that they will from then on be pegged at a level R new < R ~ 
Then the economy moves immediately from one steady state to another, and the 
results in Proposition 10 imply that 
new MT ~new WT _##~i~_( 1 +rt~ 
Mr -  1 /~old Wr_ 1 
Thus if/~new >/~old, the rate of money growth will temporarily exceed the rate of 
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money growth associated with the previous steady state. (This can easily occur; for 
example, it is necessarily so ifh < 0, given that z is decreasing in R, for R low enough 
for the solution to (3.1) to be unique.) This could account for the sort of observations 
that lead authors in the Wicksellian tradition to regard the initial effects of an 
attempt to peg interest rates at a lower level as disequilibrium phenomena. 2~ But 
we see that such observations are in fact consistent with a determinate rational 
expectations equilibrium. 
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